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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Pursuant to this Court's Order dated May 24, 2017, and pursuant to Rule 
24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following three questions 
are presented for review: 
1. Are the Utah State University Research Foundation and 
the Utah State University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation 
entitled to immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
(Immunity Act or the Act) as a public corporation and/or an 
instrumentality of the state? 
2. Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 vest exclusive, 
original jurisdiction over any action brought under the Immunity Act in 
the district courts and venue in the county in which the claim arose or 
in Salt Lake County. Do these provisions reflect an intent by the State 
of Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign immunity to 
suits brought in Utah district courts? 
3. If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, does the 
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah or any litigant have 
authority under Utah law to waive the jurisdictional and venue 
provisions enacted ~y the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act? 
A court of the United States has asked this Court for guidance with respect 
to those specific questions of Utah law. Accordingly, this Court is "not presented 
with a decision to affirm or reverse, and traditional standards of review do not 
apply." Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Qwest Dex, Inc., 2006 UT 41, iJ 11, 144 P.3d 
1079 ( analyzing Utah law question certified by the Tenth Circuit). 
This Court has 'jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78-2-2(1) to answers a 
~ question of law certified by the" United States District Court for the District of 
6 
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Utah. Id. On certification, this Court only answer "the legal questions presented 
without resolving the underlying dispute." Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT ~ 
64, 17, 167 P.3d 1058 (additional quotations and citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
because the provisions at issue are not lengthy, no addendum setting out the 
provisions at issue is necessary. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1). The constitutional 
provision and statutes of central importance are set out verbatim below. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(6). 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7-102(4) 
"Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as both 
are defined in this section. 
UTAHCODEANN. § 63G-7-102(8) 
"Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, 
community reinvestment agency, special improvement or taxing district, local 
district, special service district, any entity created by an interlocal agreement 
7 
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adopted under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act, or other 
~ governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7-102(10) 
"State" means the state of Utah, and includes each office, department, 
division, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, Children's Justice Center, or other instrumentality of the state. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-501(1) 
The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action 
brought under this chapter. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-502(1) 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose or in Salt Lake County. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings in Trial Court 
This case concerns GeoMetWatch's allegations that the defendants have 
breached multiple of their obligations to GeoMetWatch, including by 
misappropriating GeoMetWatch's trade secrets and materially breaching their 
contracts with GeoMetWatch. (R13). In May of 2014, GeoMetWatch brought 
claims against the defendants in the United States District Court for the District of 
vii Utah (the "Federal Case"), based on diversity jurisdiction. 
8 
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After years of litigation, and near the end of fact discovery, in December of 
2016, USURF1 and AWSF2 filed motions for partial summary judgment, arguing 
they were governmental entities subject to sovereign immunity. USURF and 
AWSF argued that, because GeoMetWatch had not complied with the notice 
provisions of the Immunity Act, most of the claims against USURF and AWSF 
should be dismissed. (R242-419). At the completion of briefing on those motions, 
the federal district court sought certification of the three questions now before this 
Court. (R518). 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review 
GeoMetWatch is a weather satellite technology company that was founded 
and controlled by former members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (''NOAA") and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(''NASA"). (R573-75). 
USURF is a commercial enterprise owned by Utah State University 
("USU") that boasts revenues through June of 2015 exceeding $7 4 million. 
(R663). USURF has been responsible for the design, fabrication, and operation of 
sensors on over 430 spaces missions. (R194). USURF's employees are not 
1 The term "USURF ," as used in this brief, means Defendant Utah State 
University Research Foundation. 
2 The term "AWSF," as used in this brief, means Defendant Utah State 
University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation. 
9 
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employees of the state of Utah; they are employees ofUSURP. (R646:19). AWSF 
1:/J is also owned by USU and was developed for the business enterprise that 
GeoMetWatch had created. (R577). 
Article II, Section 6(d) ofUSURP's bylaws states that "[t]he property, 
affairs, and business of [USURP] shall be subject to oversight by [USURP's] 
Board." (R275). USURP's bylaws further provide that its "Board provides 
oversight and direction for [USURP]' s policies, procedures and resource 
allocations .... " (R275). USURP's articles of incorporation state that one of 
USURP's purposes is to "[c]onduct research in areas deemed appropriate by the 
governing Board of Trustees of the [USURP] .... " (R268). USURP prominently 
states on its website that it is "governed by an independent Board of Trustees." 
(R657). USURP's officers (who are not state employees) direct the "day-to-day 
business affairs" of USURP. (R278). 
AWSF's bylaws state that "[t]he business and affairs of [AWSF] shall be 
managed by its Board of Directors .... " (R360). AWSF's articles of 
incorporation state that A WSF is managed by, and reports to, its own independent 
Board of Directors. (R354 (stating that AWSF's purpose is "[t]o pursue ... 
activities as may be determined by the Board of Directors consistent with the 
requirements of IRC §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(3)")). 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants USURP and A WSF were engaged in a joint enterprise with 
GeoMetWatch to develop an advanced, next-generation satellite-based weather 
sensing system. (R568). USURF and A WSF were responsible for the construction 
of the sensor, while GeoMetWatch was responsible for the commercialization of 
the sensor's data. (R576-77). As part of that enterprise, GeoMetWatch entered 
into agreements with USURP and A WSF, which agreements contained non-
disclosure and confidentiality provisions, as well as exclusivity obligations. 
(R568). 
In the fall of 2013, USURP and AWSF introduced GeoMetWatch to Alan 
Hall, an individual whom they represented to GeoMetWatch was a person 
interested in investing in the enterprise. (R569). As GeoMetWatch later 
discovered, however, USURF and A WSF were working with Hall to 
misappropriate GeoMetWatch's trade secrets and to deprive GeoMetWatch of the 
business opportunity that it had created. (R592). 
Prior to GeoMetWatch filing its complaint in May of 2014, AWSF, along 
with other defendants, filed a declaratory judgment action against GeoMetWatch in 
the First District Court of the State of Utah, Case No. 140100173 (the "State 
Case"). 
GeoMetWatch removed the State Case to federal court and then successfully 
moved for consolidation of the State Case and Federal Case, which consolidation 
11 
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occurred on April 3, 2015. (R306). Although AWSF objected to removal and 
~ consolidation, it did not object on governmental immunity grounds. Rather, it 
simply joined the other defendants' objection to removal, which objection was 
1~ based on alleged technical deficiencies. (R306). 
When AWSF answered GeoMetWatch's complaint in July of 2014, it did 
not allege a defense of sovereign immunity under the Act or otherwise. (R303). 
GeoMetWatch amended its complaint in December of 2014 to include 
claims against USURF. (R305). AWSF served its answer to GeoMetWatch's 
amended complaint on January 16, 2015 and, again, did not assert a defense of 
sovereign immunity. (R305). While USURF included sovereign immunity as an 
affirmative defense in answering GeoMetWatch's amended complaint, it never 
raised that issue with the federal court or counsel until years later-after the parties 
had spent years and hundreds of thousands of dollars litigating the substantive 
validity of the claims against USURF and A WSF, as reflected in the docket for the 
Federal Case. (Rl-69). 
USURF and A WSF filed counterclaims against GeoMetWatch and a third-
party complaint related to GeoMetWatch's claims in the Federal Case. (R108-
204). 
It was not until December of 2016, when USURF and A WSF filed motions 
for summary judgment, that USURF and A WSF argued they were governmental 
12 
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entities subject to sovereign immunity and that, because GeoMetWatch had not 
complied with the notice provisions of the Immunity Act, most of the claims 
against USURF and A WSF should be dismissed. (R242-419). The three certified 
questions relate to those arguments under the Act. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Question No. 1: Are the Utah State University Research Foundation 
and the Utah State University Advanced Weather Systems Foundation 
entitled to immunity under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
(Immunity Act or the Act) as a public corporation and/or an instrumentality 
of the state? 
No. While the Immunity Act does not define the terms "public corporation" 
or "instrumentality of the state," and while there appears to be no Utah case law 
interpreting those terms for purposes of the Act, numerous courts across the 
country addressing the issue of what constitutes a governmental entity for purposes 
of their own, similar immunity acts or the Eleventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution have developed essentially the same key factors to aid in 
making this determination. This Court should adopt and apply those same factors 
to the undisputed record to answer Question No. 1. 
Applying those factors, neither USURF nor A WSF are public corporations 
or instrumentalities of the state under the Immunity Act (or otherwise). Neither 
13 
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USURF nor A WSF are subject to legislative or executive oversight. And, neither 
v, entity relies upon state funds. Both USURF and A WSF were created to have an 
active role in the marketplace. Money flows from USURF and A WSF to Utah 
~ State University ("USU"), and not the other way around. Additionally, neither 
entity employs or is controlled by state employees neither entity performs integral 
state functions, and a judgment against either entity would not be a judgment 
against the state. Accordingly, neither entity is "a governmental entity" for 
purposes of the Immunity Act. 
Question No. 2: Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 vest 
exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action brought under the Immunity 
Act in the district courts and venue in the county in which the claim arose or 
in Salt Lake County. Do these provisions reflect an intent by the State of 
Utah to limit the Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign immunity to suits 
brought in Utah district courts? 
No. The State of Utah did not intend that the Act limit waiver of sovereign 
to suits brought in Utah state courts. But, this question is not relevant to USURF 
and A WSF's waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Case because the 
sovereign immunity that was waived allowing USURF and A WSF to be sued in 
federal court relates to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
not the Immunity Act. 
14 
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The Immunity Act is but one expression of the principle of state sovereign 
immunity. The State of Utah did not intend the Immunity Act and its waiver 
provisions to encapsulate all principles associated with the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The Immunity Act codifies state common law concerning state 
sovereign immunity, which immunizes state entities from being sued in their own 
state courts. The Immunity Act waives that state sovereign immunity to permit 
suits in Utah state courts against Utah governmental entities on claims expressly 
waived under the Act. 
The Act does not and cannot govern the sovereign immunity granted to 
states from suits in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. That immunity 
and the waiver of that immunity is governed by federal law and, specifically, 
federal court decisions interpreting and applying the Eleventh Amendment. 
Question No. 3: If question 2 is answered in the affirmative, does the Office 
of the Attorney General for the State of Utah or any litigant have authority under 
Utah law to waive the jurisdictional and venue provisions enacted by the Utah 
Legislature in the Immunity Act? 
While GeoMetWatch did not answer Question No. 2 in the affirmative, the 
answer to this question is "yes." A governmental entity can waive its sovereign 
immunity, including the jurisdictional and venue provisions under the Act. Utah 
15 
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case law makes clear that the Immunity Act is an affirmative defense that can be 
waived, including by conduct. 
In any event and assuming that USURF and A WSF are governmental 
entities, the answer to this question is not relevant to USURF 's and A WSF 's 
waivers of sovereign immunity in the Federal Case. As stated in the answer to 
Question No. 2 above, whether USURF and AWSF (if they are detennined to be 
governmental entities) have waived their immunity from suit in federal court is 
governed by the Eleventh Amendment, not the Act. Utah case law makes clear 
that the Immunity Act addresses a governmental entity's sovereign immunity from 
being sued in its own state courts. Thus, the relevant question is not whether the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act can be waived, it is whether USURF 
and A WSF are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment 
or whether they have waived that immunity as a matter of federal law. 
Federal courts have held that a governmental entity may waive its sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in a number of ways, including by 
voluntarily invoking jurisdiction of federal courts or by its litigation conduct. 
Here, to the extent USURF and A WSF enjoy sovereign immunity because 
they are governmental entities, the jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act 
have no impact on whether USURP and A WSF can be sued by GeoMetWatch in 
federal court. The case was brought in federal court, not state court, and 
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consequently their immunity from suit in federal court is governed by the Eleventh 
Amendment, not the Act. 
Under the applicable federal law, USURF and A WSF waived their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, including by voluntarily invoking 
the federal court's jurisdiction through counterclaims and third-party claims, as 
well as by their active participation in the Federal Case for over two years, 
consuming hundreds of thousands of dollars in discovery and motion practice 




USURF AND A WSF ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY UNDER THE ACT 
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and Waiver of 
Immunity 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a long-standing principle "rooted in 
the medieval British notion that the King could do no wrong" and protects 
sovereigns from being sued in their own courts without their consent. Trujillo v. 
Utah Dep't ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227,113,986 P.2d 752; see also Nevada v. 
Hall, 440 U.S. 410,414 (1979) ("The immunity of a truly independent sovereign 
from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for 
centuries."); Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983) ("Sovereign 
immunity-the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its 
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consent-was a well-settled principle of American common law at the time Utah 
became a state."). 
Though initially based on the idea that the King (i.e., the state) could do no 
\@ wrong, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity now exists primarily to protect the 
states' treasuries. See Federal Maritime Comm 'n v. South Carolina State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002) (stating that "state sovereign immunity serves the 
important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving the States' 
ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens" (additional 
Iii 
quotations and citation omitted)). 
Most jurisdictions have codified some principle of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in their constitutions or in their statutes. For example, the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution is one such manifestation of the 
doctrine. See U.S. Co~ST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United State~ 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
In 1966, Utah codified some portions of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
with the Immunity Act. See Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 (stating that the Act, ''which 
became effective in 1966, reaffirmed governmental immunity 'for any injury 
which results from the exercise of a governmental function"'). 
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In many codifications of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including in 
the Immunity Act, the sovereign has waived its sovereign immunity for certain 
types of claims. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (listing waivers of immunity 
for suits in state courts, including for contractual obligations); see also COLO. REV. 
STAT.§ 24-10-106 (listing waivers of immunity for suits in state court, including 
for dangerous conditions of public buildings); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l) (waiving 
immunity for the federal government to be sued in federal court for most torts 
committed by persons acting on behalf of the federal government). 
Sovereigns consent to those waivers for a number of reasons, including to 
induce private corporations to enter into contractual agreements with states without 
fear there could be no recovery in the event of a breach, as well as concern for 
fairness and equity for injured plaintiffs. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of 
Garden City, 325 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing the rationales for 
various kinds of waivers of immunity); see also David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts 
and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 375, 
377 (2011) (noting that "a concern for fairness and equity in favor of aggrieved 
plaintiffs" was one reason for the passage of legislation allowing some tort claims 
against the federal government in federal court). 
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B. Determination of Governmental Entities Entitled to 
Sovereign Immunity Under the Act 
The Immunity Act defines a "governmental entity" as "the state and its 
political subdivisions." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-102(3). The "state" is defined 
to include a ''hospital, college, university ... or other instrumentality of the state." 
Id. -102(9). "Political subdivision" is defined to include "a public corporation." 
\@ Id. -102(7). The Act does not define "instrumentality of the state" or "public 
corporation." And, there does not appear to be any Utah case law giving guidance 
on how to determine whether an entity is an "instrumentality of the state" or a 
"public corporation" under the Act. 
That said, many jurisdictions across the country have addressed this question 
in the context of their own, similar immunity acts, constitutions, or common laws 
and have formulated similar factors to aid in the analysis.3 Those same factors are 
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Reddoch, 198 So.3d 497, 505 (Ala. 2015) (identifying 
non-exhaustive factors to include ''whether a result favorable to the plaintiff would 
directly affect a contract or property right of the State, ... whether the defendant is 
simply a conduit through which the plaintiff seeks recovery of damages from the 
State, ... and whether a judgment against the officer would directly affect the 
financial status of the State treasury"); Hartman v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 22 
P .3d 524, 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) ( examining (1) how the entity was 
characterized by state law, (2) the level of autonomy and independence the entity 
enjoyed from the control of the state, (3) and whether any judgment against the 
entity would ultimately be paid by the state); Town of Rocky Hill v. SecureCare 
Realty, LLC, 105 A.3d 857 (Conn. 2015) (examining whether (1) the state created 
the entity and expressed an intention in the enabling legislation that the entity be 
treated as a state agency; (2) the entity was created for a public purpose or to carry 
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out a function integral to state government; (3) the entity is financially dependent 
on the state; (4) the entity's officers, directors or trustees are state functionaries; (5) 
the entity is operated by state employees; (6) the state has the right to control the 
entity; (7) the entity's budget, expenditures and appropriations are closely 
monitored by the state; and (8) a judgment against the entity would have the same 
effect as a judgment against the state); Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass 'n, Inc., 175 
So. 3d 724, 726-27 (Fla. 2015) ("[T]he key factor in determining whether a private 
corporation is an instrumentality of the state for sovereign immunity purposes is 
the level of governmental control over the performance and day-to-day operations 
of the corporation." (additional quotations and citation omitted)); Veolia Water 
Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat'/ Tr. Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 10 n.10 (Ind. 2014), on reh 'g, 
12 N.E.3d 240 (Ind. 2014) (considering (1) whether the state statutes and case law 
view the agency as an arm of the state, (2) the source of the entity's funding, (3) 
the entity's degree of local autonomy, (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily 
with local as opposed to statewide, problems, ( 5) whether the entity has the 
authority to sue and be sued in its own name, and ( 6) whether the entity has the 
right to hold and use property); Pauly v. Chang, 498 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2015) ( examining whether entity operated under direction and control of state 
and was funded by state treasury); Davio v. Nebraska Dep 't of Health & Human 
Servs., 786 N.W.2d 655, 663-64 (Neb. 2010) (noting that if a judgment against a 
private party ''would be paid from public funds," the action was in essence, an 
action against the state); Royster v. New Jersey State Police, 110 A.3d 934, 943 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) ("[C]ourts should consider: (1) whether the 
money that would pay any judgment against the entity would come from the State; 
(2) the status of the entity under state law, including its treatment under the law 
and whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the entity can sue or be 
sued in its own right, or is immune from state taxation; and (3) the entities degree 
of autonomy from the State."); Memorial Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tatsch Constr., Inc., 12 
P .3d 431, 441 (N.M. 2000) ( concluding that "the standard to be applied is whether 
under the totality of the circumstances the government entity is so intertwined with 
the private entity that the private entity has become an alter ego of the public 
entity."); Abbott v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 627 S.E.2d 482,484 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2006) (holding that state board of nursing was state agency entitled to 
sovereign immunity where the board was created by the General Assembly, the 
Governor and General Assembly appoint the board's members, and the board 
performed a public purpose); Clarke v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ., 175 P.3d 418, 
427 (Or. 2007) ("An instrumentality of the state performs a function traditionally 
performed by the state. Additionally, the state generally outlines the powers and 
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used by federal courts in analyzing whether an entity is entitled to state sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, 
e.g., Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 240 (2d 
duties of its instrumentalities, either via statutory enactment or some other method. 
An instrumentality of the state is subject, at least in part, to the control of the state 
in some way."); Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pa., 929 
A.2d 1169 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ( stating that "the important factors to be 
considered are whether the entity was created by the state to perform a state 
function so that a judgment against it would, in essence, injure the state"); Rhode 
Island Turnpike & Bridge Auth. v. Nugent, 182 A.2d 427, 432 (R.I. 1962) (holding 
that bridge authority was state instrumentality with sovereign immunity where it 
was a tax free, self-supporting, non-profit organization with unpaid officers, 
reporting to state and collecting tolls only to keep bridge in repair and to pay cost 
before specified time when bridge should pass to state); Health Promotion 
Specialists, LLCv. South Carolina Bd. of Dentistry, 743 S.E.2d 808,814 (S.C. 
2013) (considering whether the entity performs the work of the state, whether the 
entity was created by the legislature, and whether the entity is subject to local 
control); University Interscholastic League v. Southwest Officials Ass 'n, Inc., 319 
S.W.3d 952, 958 {Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that entity was a "governmental 
unit" where it was "required by statute to implement state . . . policies, granted 
rulemaking and enforcement power over such policies, subjected to extensive 
oversight from the legislative and executive branches, and statutorily classified as a 
component part of a governmental unit that was created by the Texas 
constitution"); Jacobs v. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. of Vt., 816 A.2d 517, 522-24 
(Vt. 2002) ("The first factor is whether a judgment against the entity will be paid 
for by the state .... The second factor commonly considered is how much 
autonomy the entity enjoys in carrying out its functions."); Arnold Agency v. West 
Virginia Lottery Comm 'n, 526 S.E.2d 814, 823 (W. Va. 1999) (noting that the five 
factors to consider are: (1) whether the body functions statewide; (2) whether it 
does the state's work; (3) whether it was created by an act of the legislature; ( 4) 
whether it is subject to local control; and (5) its financial dependence on state 
coffers); Lister v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 240 N. W.2d 610, 617 
(Wis. 1976) (holding that the test is whether the relief sought would require 
payment from state funds). 
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Cir. 2006) (reiterating "a test that requires us initially to consider six pertinent 
factors: (1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how 
the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is funded; 
( 4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or state government; 
(5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's actions; and (6) whether the 
entity's obligations are binding upon the state" ( additional quotations and citation 
omitted)); United States ex rel. Fields v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Missouri-lllinois 
Metro. Dist., No. 16-3783, 2017 WL 3254401, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) 
(applying six-factor test). 
There is no dispute here that courts use these factors, and not some other 
method, to determine whether an entity is a governmental entity for sovereign 
immunity purposes when the terms are not defined. Courts have developed and 
used these factors because they go to the very essence of a state's characteristics 
entitling it to the powerful cloak of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. 
Co. v. Trustees of State Coils. in Colo., 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th Cir. 
1966)( explaining that the factors are developed to determine whether the suit is 
really a suit against the state); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F .2d 1146, 
1150 (4th Cir. 1974). Indeed, it is axiomatic that, to avail one's self of sovereign 
immunity, one must be a sovereign or tantamount to a sovereign. 
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A comprehensive review of case law across the country reveals the 
fallowing six factors encompass those factors courts routinely use to determine 
whether an entity is a governmental entity for purposes of sovereign immunity: ( 1) 
whether the entity is subject to legislative or executive control; (2) whether the 
entity is financially dependent upon the state; (3) whether the entity is staffed by 
state employees; (4) whether the entity was created by the state; (5) whether the 
entity serves integral state functions; and ( 6) whether a judgment against the entity 
would have the same effect as a judgment against the state. 
This Court should adopt and use these factors for its analysis because they 
are the best method to determine whether an actor should be granted sovereignty 
status entitling it to state sovereign immunity. 
C. The Factors Show that USURF and A WSF Are Not 
Governmental Entities Entitled to State Sovereign 
v, Immunity Under the Act 
As the parties claiming sovereign immunity, it is USURF and A WSF's 
burden to prove that they are entitled to such immunity. See, e.g., Hart v. Salt 
Lake City. Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "the 
supreme court has specifically stated that the defendant has the burden of proving 
that it is shielded from liability by governmental immunity"); Woods, 466 F.3d at 
251 ( stating that "the defendant Board of Education bore the burden of 
~ demonstrating that it was an arm of the state entitled to dismissal of this action on 
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the ground of Eleventh Amendment immunity"). Applying the six factors set forth 
above, neither USURF nor A WSF can satisfy their burden to show that it is a 
"public corporation" or "instrumentality of the state" entitled to state governmental 
immunity under the Immunity Act. 4 
1. Neither USURF nor A WSF Are Subject to Legislative or 
Executive Oversight. 
Whether the entity in question is subject to legislative or executive oversight 
is a key factor courts use to determine whether an entity is a governmental entity 
for sovereign immunity purposes. For example, when examining immunity under 
Florida's sovereign immunity statute, the "key factor ... is the level of 
govern.mental control over the performance and day-to-day operations of the 
corporation." UCF Athletics Ass 'n Inc. v. Plancher, 121 So.3d 1097, 1106 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Plancher v. UCF Athletics 
Ass 'n, Inc., 175 So.3d 724 (Fla. 2015). 
Similarly, in New Mexico and Texas, an important consideration is whether 
the corporate entity is "subject to legislative oversight." Isler v. New Mexico 
Activities Ass 'n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1154 (D.N.M. 2012) (finding that 
4 This Court has asked whether USURF and A WSF are govern.mental 
entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act. In making that 
determination, the Court should use the factors outlined in this brief. However, the 
same factors are also used to determine whether USURF and A WSF may invoke 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amended to bar suit in the Federal Case. 
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organization regulating interscholastic sports was entitled to immunity under New 
~ Mexico's Tort Claims Act, in part, because it was "subject to legislative oversight 
in ways that are inconsistent with private entity status"); see also University 
~ Interscholastic League, 319 S.W.3d at 958 (finding that entity was "governmental 
unit" under Texas Tort Claims Act, where the entity was "subjected to extensive 
oversight from the legislative and executive branches"). 
To enjoy immunity, the entity in question "must be subject to something 
more than the sort of control that is exercised by the government in its regulatory 
capacity." UCF Athletics, 121 So.3d at 1106. "[T]he mere fact that a corporation 
is created by the government will not necessarily establish that it is a governmental 
agency or instrumentality." Id. 
Neither USURF nor A WSF is subject to legislative or executive oversight, 
as reflected in their bylaws and articles of incorporation. Article II, Section 6( d) of 
USURF's bylaws states that "[t]he property, affairs, and business of [USURF] 
shall be subject to oversight by [USURF's] Board." (R275 (emphasis added)). 
USURF's bylaws further provide that its "Board provides oversight and direction 
for [USURF]'s policies, procedures and resource allocations .... " (R275). 
USURF's articles of incorporation are similar, stating that one ofUSURF's 
purposes is to "[ c ]onduct research in areas deemed appropriate by the governing 
Board of Trustees of the [USURFJ ... . " (R268 (emphasis added)). USURF 
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prominently states on its website that it is "governed by an independent Board of 
Trustees." (R657). USURF's officers (who are not state employees) direct the 
"day-to-day business affairs" ofUSURF. (R278). 
With respect to AWSF, its bylaws state that "[t]he business and affairs of 
[AWSF] shall be managed by its Board of Directors .... " (R360). AWSF's 
articles of incorporation state that A WSF is managed by, and reports to, its own 
independent Board of Directors. (R354) (Stating that A WSF's purpose is "[t]o 
pursue ... activities as may be determined by the Board of Directors consistent 
with the requirements ofIRC §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)(3)" (emphasis added)). 
Simply put, neither Utah's legislature nor its executive branch exercise 
control or oversight over USURF's or AWSF's day-to-day operations, 
management, business activities, purposes, or policies. This factor therefore 
weighs in favor of a finding that neither of these organizations is a "governmental 
entity" under the Immunity Act. 
2. Neither USURP nor A WSF Are Financially Dependent 
on the State of Utah 
Another factor courts consider is whether the corporate entity is financially 
dependent on the state in determining whether the entity is a state governmental 
entity. See, e.g., Rocky Hill, 105 A.3d at 867. Courts have applied this factor by 
examining the flow of money, i.e., whether money flows from the state to the 
entity. For example, in U.S. ex rel. Sikk~nga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of 
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Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006), the Tenth Circuit found that Associated 
~ Regional and University Pathologists ("ARUP") was not a state entity entitled to 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, including because ''the bulk of ARUP's 
~ revenues flow from ARUP's commercial operations to the University, rather than 
from the University to ARUP." 472 F.3d at 720 (emphasis added). 
USURP and A WSF are financially independent from the State of Utah and 
USU. USURP has publicly reported revenues through June of 2015 exceeding $74 
million. (R663). "[USURP]'s revenues flow from [USURP]'s commercial 
operations to the University, rather than from the University to [USURP]." 
Sikkenga, 412 F .3d at 720. Additionally, A WSF was set up solely to build 
GeoMetWatch's weather sensor for approximately $125 million, which money was 
to come from a private loan, not from USU, and certainly not from the State of 
'-' Utah. (R720). 
Courts also look at an entity's role in the marketplace as part of the factor of 
financial independence. Id. at 719. In Sikkenga, the Tenth Circuit stated that the 
university-owned laboratory was not a governmental entity, including because of 
its "nationwide activity as a commercial laboratory" and its ability to "enter into 
contracts with commercial entities." Id. at 719-20. 
USURP's and A WSF's roles in the marketplace also show that neither of 
them is financially dependent upon the state. Both USURF and A WSF have 
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entered into substantial economic contracts with private commercial entities, 
including GeoMetWatch and Defendant Tempus Global Data. USURF has, on at 
least one occasion, owned stock in a private company (i.e., GeoMetWatch). 
(R660). As of June 30, 2015, in addition to its revenue produced from federal 
contracts, USURF was also "performing work for a venture-funded, commercial 
satellite imaging company." (R664). USURF's and AWSF's commercial 
enterprises are a significant factor weighing against their being deemed 
governmental entities. 
3. Neither USURF nor A WSF Are Staffed by State 
Employees 
Whether an entity is staffed by state employees is another factor courts apply 
in determining if the entity is entitled to state sovereign immunity. See Rocky Hill, 
105 A.3d at 867. Here, neither USURF nor A WSF have state employees on their 
staff. Indeed, Curtis Roberts, a defendant in this case and an employee of USURF, 
testified in his deposition that his "paycheck came from USURF ," not from the 
State of Utah, and not from USU. (R646: 19). 
Accordingly, this factor too weights in favor of finding no governmental 
immunity for USURF and A WSF. 
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4. Neither USURF nor A WSF Were Created by the State of 
Utah 
Whether an entity was created by statute or by the state is a factor courts use 
to determine whether the entity is a governmental entity for sovereign immunity 
purposes. See, e.g., In re Dodson, 259 B.R. 635,638 (Banlcr. ·E.D. Tenn. 2001) 
(noting that corporation created by statute was an "arm or agency" of the State of 
@ Tennessee). Neither USURF nor A WSF was created by statute. While USU set 
up and owns USURF and A WSF, the fact that a corporation is owned by a public 
university does not provide that corporation with governmental immunity. In 
Sikkenga, the defendant, ARUP, was wholly owned by the University of Utah, but 
the Tenth Circuit held that ARUP was not entitled to governmental immunity. See 
id., 472 F.3d at 720. 
The Texas Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Lenoir v. U. T. 
Physicians, 491 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016). In Lenoir, even though the 
defendant was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a university health science center, the 
(@ court held that it was not entitled to governmental immunity under the Texas 
governmental immunity statute, in part, because "'there is a presumption that a 
corporation, even when it is a wholly owned subsidiary of another, is a separate 
entity."' Id. at 88 (alteration omitted) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro 
Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635,643 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
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Here, there is more than a presumption that USURF and A WSF are separate 
entities from the State of Utah and USU-there are legal documents, there is 
correspondence, and there is testimony reflecting that USURF and A WSF are 
separate and distinct entities from the State of Utah and USU. For example, 
Robert Behunin, a defendant in this action and a member of A WSF's board of 
directors, stated in an email to GeoMetWatch concerning the creation of AWSF, 
that "USU, AWS[F] [and] the State of Utah are three distinct entities," and that 
this distinction provided "USU and the State of Utah with protection from 'risk."' 
(R69 5 ( emphasis added)). 
Thus, this factor weighs against a finding that USURF or A WSF is a 
governmental entity. 
5. Neither USURF nor A WSF Serve Integral State 
Functions 
In Coppage Construction Co., Inc. v. Sanitation District No. 1, 459 S.W.3d 
855 (Ky. 2015), the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered whether a sanitation 
district was a governmental entity entitled to sovereign immunity. The court 
looked primarily to whether the sanitation district served an "integral state 
function." Id. at 862 ("The question of whether an entity carries out an integral 
state function has remained the primary focus of our sovereign immunity analysis 
since at least the turn of the twentieth century."). In finding that the sanitation 
district did not serve an integral state function, the court reasoned: 
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While the services provided by [the sanitation district] are no doubt 
critically important within the counties it serves, [ the sanitation district] 
simply does not perform an integral state function. Sewage disposal 
and storm water management systems are not a traditional and 
necessary state function such as those functions performed by the state 
police, our public schools, the corrections system, and public highways 
and airways. 
Id. at 864 (emphases added). 
If the functions of a sanitation district are not integral state functions, the 
purely commercial, profit-driven functions of USURF and A WSF certainly are not. 
While USURF and A WSF may serve important purposes within the state, 
including by providing employment and research opportunities for the citizenry 
and USU, those purposes are not "critically important to a state function," such as 
"functions performed by the state police, our public schools, the corrections 
system, and public highways and airways." Id. 
Accordingly, this factor also demonstrates that neither USURF nor A WSF 
are governmental entities under the Immunity Act. 
6. A Judgment Against USURF or A WSF Would Not Be a 
Judgment Against the State 
Because one of the purposes of sovereign immunity is to protect the states' 
~ coffers, most courts that have analyzed whether an entity is a part of the state ask 
whether a judgment against the entity would impact the state's treasury. See 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984) ("The 
general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if the judgment sought would 
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expend itself on the public treasury . . .. " ( additional quotations and citation 
omitted)). 
In this case, a judgment against USURF or A WSF would not impact the 
treasury of the State of Utah. If GeoMetWatch obtains a judgment against USURF 
or A WSF, GeoMetWatch would execute on their assets, which assets include 
USURF's $74 million in annual revenue, the intellectual property owned by 
USURF and A WSF, and the contract rights owned by USURF and A WSF. 
GeoMetWatch would not look to the State of Utah to satisfy a judgment against 
USURF or AWSF. 
Thus, all six of the routinely employed factors unanimously weigh in favor 
of finding that neither USURF nor A WSF are governmental entities under the 
Immunity Act. In such circumstances, "that answer controls" the sovereign 
immunity inquiry. Woods, 466 F.3d at 243 (affirming district c~urt's denial of 
defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity). 
D. USURF's and A WSF's Status as Non-Profit Corporations 
Does Not Make Them Governmental Entities 
Both USURF and A WSF argued in their summary judgment motions that 
their status as non-profit corporations under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code makes them governmental entities entitled to the procedural 
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protections of the Act. However, their status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit does not 
~ entitle them to immunity. 
In Sikkenga, the Tenth Circuit made clear that an entity's status as a 
501(c)(3) non-profit does not bestow state sovereign immunity on it, holding that a 
501(c)(3) non-profit laboratory wholly owned by the University of Utah was not a 
governmental entity entitled to sovereign immunity, and reasoning that the entity at 
issue "earns the bulk of its revenue from its operations outside the University 
community ... can enter into contracts with commercial entities, and maintains 
bank accounts in its own name." Id. at 719-20; see also Woodford v. Glenville 
State Coils. Housing Corp., 225 S.E.2d 671, 672 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a 
non-profit corporation was not an instrumentality of the state and did not enjoy 
sovereign immunity from suit under the state constitution). 
Additionally, despite specifically identifying numerous entities that are 
tantamount to the state, the Act itself makes no mention of nonprofits or 50 I ( c )(3) 
corporations. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-102(10) ("'State' means the state of 
Utah, and includes each office, department, division, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, Children's Justice 
Center, or other instrumentality of the state."). 
Moreover, accepting USURP and A WSF's argument that an entity's status 
as a 501(c)(3) organization makes that organization a sovereign entity with the 
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protection of sovereign immunity would lead to absurd results. If that proposition 
were the law, then white supremacist entities organized as 501(c)(3) non-profits 
would be able to claim sovereign immunity as arms of the state.5 An entity's status 
as a 501 ( c )(3) organization simply is not relevant to the analysis of whether that 
entity is a "public corporation" or "instrumentality of the state" entitled to 
sovereign immunity. 
In sum, the Court should expressly adopt and apply the non-exhaustive 
factors employed by sister states and federal courts, as described more fully above, 
in answering Question No. 1. Each of these factors weighs against a finding that 
USURF or A WSF is a governmental entity protected by sovereign immunity under 
the Act. 
II. SECTIONS 63G-7-501 AND -502 DO NOT REFLECT AN INTENT BY 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO BAR SUITS AGAINST STATE 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES IN FEDERAL COURT 
Even if this Court were to hold that USURF and A WSF are Utah state 
governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act (which it 
should not), this Court should rule that the Immunity Act does not reflect an intent 
5 For example, the New Century Foundation, a 501(c)(3) entity which hosted ~ 
an annual conference that included neo-Nazis and white supremacists, raises 
money for the benefit of the "white race," and holds its tax-deductible donations 
"in trust for the white race." See Michael Kunzelman, White Nationalists Raise 
Millions with Tax-Exempt Charities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 22, 2016, ~ 
https://www.apnews.com/ aelc8163ac574bb3bdlf3facfca5fb83. 
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by the State of Utah to bar suits against the state in federal court. The Eleventh 
\@ Amendment of the United States Constitution-not the Act-governs whether a 
Utah governmental entity has sovereign immunity from suits in federal court. 
\(i} 
State sovereign immunity under state law, such as that embodied in the Act, 
is "the principal that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent." 
Madsen, 658 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added). The Federal Case is not a suit in the 
Utah state courts against a Utah governmental entity and, thus, the Act's 
codification of the principle that Utah cannot be sued in its own courts, except as 
expressly waived in the Act, are inapplicable. 
Because the Act is inapplicable to the Federal Case, the Immunity Act has 
no effect on whether a Utah governmental entity has waived its immunity from suit 
in federal court; that is the province of the Eleventh Amendment, which can be 
waived by conduct, even in the face of a state statutory immunity act. See, e.g., 
Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F.3d 1158, 1172 (10th Cir. 2014) (fmding waiver of 
Oklahoma's right not to be sued in federal court by consenting to removal, despite 
existence of functional equivalent of Immunity Act); Ku v. Tennessee, 322 F.3d 
431, 435 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that State of Tennessee had waived its sovereign 
immunity to suit in federal court by engaging in substantial discovery, filing a 
motion for summary judgment, and only raising an immunity defense after the 
federal court's adverse ruling on the summary judgment motion); Hanldns v. 
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Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 856-58 (8th Cir.1992) (state waived immunity by "seek[ing] 
to take advantage of the suit for its own benefit"). 
The Trant case is instructive. In that case, the Tenth Circuit found that the 
State of Oklahoma waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal 
court by consenting to removal to federal court and thereby voluntarily invoking 
the federal. court's jurisdiction. See id. The court's conclusion was in the face of 
Oklahoma's equivalent of the Immunity Act, namely, the Governmental Tort 
Claims Act ("GTCA"), which states, in relevant part: 
[t]he state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, 
waives its [sovereign] immunity and that of its political subdivisions. 
In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any 
rights under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Venue for actions against the state within the scope of [ the 
GTCA] shall be either the county in which the cause of action arose or 
Oklahoma County, except that a constitutional state agency, board or 
commission may, upon resolution filed with the Secretary of State, 
designate another situs for venue in lieu of Oklahoma County. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 152.l(B), 163. 
Like the GTCA, the Immunity Act expressly limits waivers of sovereign 
immunity to those "expressly waived in [the Act]." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63G-7-
301(3) ("A governmental entity and an employee of a governmental entity retain 
immunity from suit unless that immunity has been expressly waived in this 
chapter."). And, like the GTCA, the Immunity Act has jurisdiction and venue 
provisions. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 63G-7-501, -502. Accordingly, like the 
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defendant in Trant, USURF and AWSF are subject to suit in federal court, even if 
they are entitled to sovereign immunity and subject to the Act, including the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act. 
In further response to the second certified question, the language of the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Immunity Act demonstrates that the 
Act's protections do not apply to the claims GeoMetWatch has brought against 
USURF and A WSF in the federal case. This is because GeoMetWatch's claims 
are not brought under the Act. The Immunity Act expressly confines its 
jurisdictional and venue provisions to claims brought under the Act. Section 63G-
7-505(1) states, "[t]he district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any 
action brought under this chapter." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-501(1) (emphasis 
added). That chapter (i.e., Chapter 7) is the Immunity Act. And, Section 502 of 
the Immunity Act likewise necessarily relates to claims brought in Utah state court. 
See id. -502(1). Thus, under the plain language of the Immunity Act, its 
jurisdictional and venue provisions do not extend beyond claims brought under the 
Act. In other words, if a plaintiff brings a cause of action against a governmental 
entity that does not rely on the waiver of immunity set forth in the Act (i.e., 
allowing itself to be sued in its own courts in certain circumstances), then the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions in the Act do not apply. 
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Here, GeoMetWatch has not brought claims against USURP or AWSF based 
on the waivers of immunity expressed in the Immunity Act. Nowhere in its 
pleadings or its papers has GeoMetWatch articulated a reliance upon the waivers 
expressed in the Immunity Act. GeoMetWatch did not even mention the Act, 
including because there was no argument or factor that suggested that USURP or 
A WSF were akin to the sovereign. Accordingly, because the Immunity Act only 
touches on issues of sovereign immunity in Utah state courts, and because 
GeoMetWatch has not brought an action under the Immunity Act, the jurisdictional 
and venue provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature do not apply to 
GeoMetWatch's claims in the Federal Case. 
III. UTAH ENTITIES MAY WAIVE THE JURISDICTIONAL AND 
VENUE PROVISIONS UNDER THE IMMUNITY ACT 
Even if this Court determines that USURP and A WSF are governmental 
entities subject to the Immunity Act (which it should not), USURP and A WSF can 
waive application of the Act, including its jurisdictional and venue provisions. See 
Hart, 945 P.2d at 133 (holding that sovereign immunity under the Act is an 
affirmative defense that can be waived); see also Bentley v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm 'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 605 (10th Cir. 1994) (reiterating that sovereign 
immunity under the GTCA was an affirmative defense that the governmental entity 
waived). 
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However, it is not necessary for USURF or A WSF to waive the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act to be sued by Geo Met Watch in 
federal court. The jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Act are not 
determinative of whether USURF and AWSF can be sued in federal court. As 
discussed above, the question of a sovereign's waiver of its immunity from suit in 
federal court is not governed by the Act, but rather the Eleventh Amendment and 
federal case law articulating the basis for waiver of sovereign immunity from suit 
in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. See e.g., Trant, 154 F.3d at 1172 
(finding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity despite existence of functional 
equivalent of Immunity Act); see also Ku, 322 F.3d at 435 (finding waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
The Eleventh Amendment grants a state immunity from suit in federal court, 
~ but a state may waive that immunity expressly or impliedly. See, e.g., Lapides v. 
Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,618 (2002) ("A State remains 
free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal court."); 
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,447 (1883) (stating that sovereign immunity is "a 
personal privilege which [the government] may waive at pleasure."). For example, 
federal courts have held that a state waives its immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment by submitting its rights for determination by the federal court or 
through its litigation conduct in federal court. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619-
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22 (holding that state waived immunity from suit in federal court on state-law 
claims for money damages when it voluntarily removed case to federal court); see 
also Ku, 322 F.3d at 435 (finding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by 
state engaging in substantial discovery, filing a motion for summary judgment, and 
only raising an immunity defense after an adverse ruling by the federal court on the 
summary judgment motion). 
The rationale for constructive waiver is to prevent inconsistent, anomalous, 
or ''unfair results." Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619 ("And this makes sense because an 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that finds waiver in the litigation 
context rests upon the Amendment's presumed recognition of the judicial need to 
avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness, and not upon a State's actual 
preference or desire, which might, after all, favor selective use of 'immunity' to 
achieve litigation advantages."). "Thus, it is not surprising that more than a 
century ago [the Supreme Court of the United States] indicated that a State's 
voluntary appearance in federal court amounted to a waiver of its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity." Id.; see also id. at 620 (ruling that a state's act of 
consenting to removal constituted a "clear" waiver of immunity). 
Here, presuming arguendo that USURF and A WSF are governmental 
entities under the Act, they have waived any immunity they might have had to suits 
in federal court by invoking the federal court's jurisdiction in filing their 
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counterclaims and a third-party complaint in the Federal Case. (RI 08-204). They 
have further waived their immunity from federal suit by their litigation conduct in 
the Federal Case, including by engaging in two years of extensive discovery-
~ taking and defending depositions, serving and responding to written discovery 
requests, and filing and opposing discovery motions-all of which was directed 
only at the substantive merit of GeoMetWatch's claims against USURF and 
AWSF, not sovereign immunity, as reflected in Docket Entries 129, 177, 186,242, 
243, 244, 263, 321, 403, 427, and others. (R30-59). The acts ofUSURF and 
A WSF in the Federal Case are far more involved than merely consenting to 
removal, which is an act that, standing alone, results in a "clear" waiver of 
immunity. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620. 
Because ofUSURF's and AWSF's conduct, the United States District Court 
'ti for the District of Utah has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims GeoMetWatch has 
asserted against USURF and A WSF in the Federal Case, and the Immunity Act is 
not a bar to that adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court should rule that neither USURF 
nor A WSF are governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity under the 
Immunity Act. 
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The Court should also rule that Utah Code sections 63G-7-501 and -502 do 
not reflect an intent by the State of Utah to limit waiver of sovereign immunity to 
suits brought in Utah state courts, and that the Act is not determinative of whether 
USURF and A WSF waived their sovereign immunity from claims against it in the 
Federal Case. 
Finally, the Court should rule that USURF and A WSF can waive the 
jurisdictional and venue provisions of the Immunity Act, even though such waiver 
is not necessary to allow GeoMetWatch's claims to proceed in the Federal Case. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2017. 
OS & GREENWOOD 
Attorneys for Appellant GeoMetWatch 
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